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Saving the Internet: Why Regulating Broadband
Providers Can Keep the Internet Open
I. INTRODUCTION
“Net Neutrality” has become a hot topic in the last few years,
but the term has gained traction and popularity since the last court
decision in Verizon v. FCC. 1 The term Net Neutrality was first coined
in 2003 by Columbia Law School professor Tim Wu. 2 Net
Neutrality is the principle that Internet providers (“broadband
providers”) should allow access to all content and applications
equally, irrespective of what the source of the content is. 3 Net
Neutrality also prohibits broadband providers from favoring or
blocking certain services or websites, 4 thus, making the Internet an
open platform for the dissemination and access of content. Under
Net Neutrality, creators of content and applications (“edge
providers”) freely disseminate content on one end and consumers
(“end users”) freely access that content on the other.
Tim Wu argues that Net Neutrality is the end result we should
be concerned with achieving, and suggests that the best remedy is a
“network neutrality” policy that allows for competition amongst the
people and organizations that disseminate their content through the
Internet. 5 Proponents of Net Neutrality argue that an open-access
regime will lead to better information, more innovation and
investment in Internet infrastructure, and preservation of freedom of
speech and freedom to access that speech. Opponents of Net
Neutrality argue that a neutral network would have the opposite
effect and actually decrease innovation and investment. In addition,
opponents, many of them broadband providers, argue that
broadband providers have a right to control what content goes
through their systems.

1. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
2. Tim Wu, Net Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 141 (2003).
3. Public Knowledge, Net Neutrality [hereinafter Net Neutrality Timeline],
https://www.publicknowledge.org/issues/net-neutrality (last visited Nov. 9, 2015).
4. Id.
5. Wu, supra note 2, at 146.
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The discussion over Net Neutrality has been ongoing for some
time, at least since 2003 when the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) first considered how to properly regulate Digital
Subscriber Line (DSL) and broadband providers. 6 The issue has
centered around two questions: first, what are the limits broadband
providers can put on the information that passes through their lines?
For example, can broadband providers block applications that
compete with their own services, can they prioritize traffic based on
affiliations with edge providers or based on how much edge
providers pay broadband providers? Second, how can the FCC
regulate broadband providers and how much authority does the
agency have to restrict broadband providers’ behavior?
Opponents of Net Neutrality had a partial win in January of
2014 when the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held in Verizon v. FCC that the FCC could not impose
anti-discrimination nor anti-blocking restrictions on broadband
providers. 7 This decision significantly reduced the FCC’s ability to
promote and ensure Net Neutrality. However, proponents of Net
Neutrality have not lost entirely. The Court’s decision also upheld
the FCC’s authority to regulate broadband providers, just not
through the anti-blocking and anti-discrimination rules the Court
reviewed. 8 By affirming the FCC’s regulatory authority, the Court
made it clear that the FCC can regulate broadband providers as long
as the FCC’s regulations stay within its statutory authority. 9 The best
way for the FCC to regulate broadband providers in order to
promote and ensure an open Internet is by reclassifying broadband
providers as common carriers subject to regulation under Title II of
the Communications Act of 1934.
After briefly discussing the history of Net Neutrality and the
events that led to Verizon v. FCC, Part II of this Paper focuses on the
D.C. District Court’s January 2014 holding that the FCC can
regulate as long as it does so within its authority. Using that rule as a
framework, this Paper argues that in its most recent ruling, the FCC
correctly reclassified broadband providers as common carriers,
concluding that this reclassification is the right path for several

6.
7.
8.
9.
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Net Neutrality Timeline, supra note 3.
Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
Id. at 642.
Id. at 639–40.
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reasons. First, Section III.A argues that broadband providers fall
within the definition of a common carrier. Section III.B shows that
classifying broadband providers as common carriers allows the FCC
to meet its statutorily imposed goal of ensuring deployment of
broadband infrastructure 10 and the Commission’s ancillary intent to
“preserve and promote the open and interconnected nature of the
public Internet.” 11 Section III.C demonstrates that an open Internet
will spur investment and innovation. Finally, Section III.D discusses
a long history of applying common carrier duties to last-mile
facilities, like broadband providers, that supports such classification.
II. THE PRE-VERIZON V. FCC ERA
To better understand Net Neutrality, some definitions are helpful
at the outset. An ‘edge provider’ is a person or organization that
provides or creates “content, services, and applications over the
Internet”; this includes providers like Google, Amazon or
Facebook. 12 ‘End users’ are those who consume edge providers’
content: people, businesses, and private and public institutions. 13
‘Broadband providers’ are local access providers who allow edge
providers to upload and end users to access content, such as
Comcast, Time Warner, and Verizon. 14
The term “Net Neutrality” first came up in Tim Wu’s 2003 article
titled Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination. In this article,
Wu suggests that a neutral network is about innovation, where the
different applications available through the Internet engage in a battle
of survival-of-the-fittest and the application that best adapts and
provides the most desirable services will survive, those that do not
adapt quickly enough, will become obsolete. 15 Proponents of Net
Neutrality argue that this survival-of-the-fittest idea is what promotes
innovation and investment in Internet infrastructure and what led to
the development of streaming video and high-speed internet. 16 As a
10. Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2008).
11. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 631 (citing In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband
Access to the Internet Over Wireline Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 14986, 14988 ¶ 4 (2005)).
12. Id. at 629.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Wu, supra note 2, at 145.
16. Brief of Amici Curiae Venture Capital Investors in Support of FCC, Verizon v.
FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (2014) (No. 11-1355), 2013 WL 210110 [hereinafter Amici Curiae].
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result, allowing price discrimination based on content would have
detrimental effects on innovation and competition between edge
providers, having “dynamic consequences, for the competitive
development of new applications.” 17
Wu further argues that the best way to ensure that the Internet
remains open and that the traffic of applications remains neutral is by
regulating the market so that broadband providers are still allowed
to discriminate between traffic, but only for legitimate reasons, like
managing bandwidth consumption, and only within the local
network that each provider owns and operates, not within the bigger
networks that connect broadband provider to each other and allow
for information to travel long distances, like from one state or
country to another. 18
Until recently, the biggest challenge to achieving Net Neutrality
was the FCC’s inability to regulate broadband providers because the
FCC chose to classify broadband providers as information services
under the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Under this statute,
Congress defined two classifications of entities: telecommunication
carriers, which involve a pure transmission that does little to alter the
supplied information; 19 and information-service providers, which
provide enhanced services that involve computer processing
applications that act on the “content, code, protocol, and other
aspects of subscriber’s information.” 20 Congress intended the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 to become incorporated into the
Communications Act of 1934, which is the statute that primarily
regulates telecommunications. Title II of the Communications Act
of 1934 imposes on certain telecommunication services what is
known as “common carrier duties.” At common law, common
carrier duties were imposed by the government on enterprises where
a monopoly could form, the enterprise was an essential public
service, or the service was of public concern in some way. 21 When an
enterprise fell within one of those three categories, the government
could require that enterprise to provide service to all that sought it,
17. Wu, supra note 2, at 153.
18. Wu, supra note 2, at 165–66.
19. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 630.
20. Id. (citing In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and
Regulations, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 387 ¶¶ 5–7 (1980) (‘‘Second Computer Inquiry”)).
21. James Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to Internet Interconnection, 54 FED.
COMM. L.J. 225, 252 (2002).
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to deal justly, reasonably, and without discrimination. 22 The
Communications Act requires that a telecommunication carrier, one
that transmits telecommunications services, be classified as a
common carrier under Title II of the Act; 23 however, the Act does
not say how an information service should be classified. 24 Thus, it
appears that the FCC chose not to classify information services, like
broadband providers, as common carriers. But, Congress did not
prohibit the FCC from classifying information services, or just
broadband providers specifically, as common carriers.
The FCC’s old classification of broadband providers was not
problematic at first, but then broadband providers acquired
technology allowing them to discriminate based on the type and
source of the content being transmitted. 25 Since broadband
providers obtained this technology, the FCC has had to decipher
how to regulate broadband providers and under what authority it
can regulate them. One of the FCC’s first attempts to regulate
broadband providers was in March of 2005 when the FCC
successfully fined a North Carolina-based broadband provider for
blocking its subscribers’ access to a competing Voice Over Internet
Protocol (VoIP) service. 26 However, in July of that same year, the
Supreme Court upheld the FCC’s classification of cable broadband
providers as information service providers, thus leaving them free
from common carrier duties. 27
The FCC took a significant step toward regulation of broadband
providers in September of 2005 with the release of an Internet Policy
Statement, which intended to “preserve and promote the open and
interconnected nature of the public Internet.” 28 Under the
Statement, the Commission would take action if it found that
Internet service providers were violating principles of openness and
interconnectedness. 29 Following the FCC’s policy statement, the

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 251.
47 U.S.C. § 153(11) (2012).
See id. § 153(24).
Amici Curiae, supra note 16, at 15–16.
Net Neutrality Timeline, supra note 3.
Id.; Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 631 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
20 FCC Rcd. 14988 ¶ 4 (2005).
Id. at 14904 ¶ 96.

715

07.CANO.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

8/4/2016 6:44 PM

2016

Senate attempted to update the Communications Act by adding a
reference to Net Neutrality, but the proposed bill was defeated. 30
In the fall of 2007, the FCC ordered Comcast to cease
discrimination of BitTorrent traffic on its network (“Comcast
Order”). 31 Comcast appealed the order and the FCC took its first hit
when the Court struck down the Comcast Order, holding that the
FCC failed to show that its action was “reasonably ancillary to
the . . .
effective
performance
of
its
statutorily
mandated responsibilities.” 32
In December of 2010, in what seems like a response to the
Comcast Order’s failure, the FCC announced the imposition of
three new rules on broadband providers. First, a transparency
requirement that broadband providers “publicly disclose accurate
information regarding the network management practices,
performance, and commercial terms of its broadband Internet access
services.” 33 Second, an anti-blocking provision prohibiting fixed
broadband providers, but not mobile suppliers like cellphone
providers, from blocking “lawful content, applications, services, or
non-harmful devices, subject to reasonable network management.” 34
The FCC defined “reasonable network management” as
management tailored to “ensur[e] network security and integrity,”
such as managing “traffic that is harmful to the network, addressing
traffic that is unwanted by end users . . . and reducing or mitigating
the effects of congestion on the network.” 35 In addition, the antiblocking requirement prohibits broadband providers from degrading
content in such a way as to render it “effectively unusable.” 36 Third,
the FCC imposed an anti-discrimination requirement that forbids
broadband providers from “unreasonably discriminat[ing in
transmission of] lawful network traffic over a consumer’s broadband
30. Net Neutrality Timeline, supra note 3; Communications, Consumer’s Choice, and
Broadband Deployment Act of 2006, S. 2686, 109th Cong. § 901 (2006),
https://www.congress.gov/109/bills/s2686/BILLS-109s2686is.pdf.
31. Id.; In re Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corp.
for Secretly Degrading Peer–to–Peer Applications, 23 F.C.C.R. 13028, 13052 ¶ 43, 13059–60 ¶
54 (2008), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-08-183A1.pdf.
32. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 644 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Am. Library
Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
33. 25 FCC Rcd. 17937 ¶ 54 (2009).
34. Id. at 17942 ¶ 63.
35. Id. at 17952 ¶ 82.
36. Id. at 17943 ¶ 66.
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Internet access service. Reasonable network management shall not
constitute unreasonable discrimination.” 37 The FCC further added
that discrimination for network management needs “during periods
of congestion” would not violate the anti-discrimination rule. 38
Verizon responded by challenging the Open Internet Order on
the grounds that the FCC lacked affirmative statutory authority to
establish the rules, the decision to impose the rules was arbitrary and
capricious, and the rules violated statutory requirements barring the
FCC
from
imposing
common
carrier
duties
on
39
broadband providers.
The D.C. Circuit Court held that the FCC correctly and
reasonably interpreted section 706(a) of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 as granting the FCC regulatory authority 40 and that it
was reasonable to think that Congress vested the FCC with statutory
authority to carry out the duties the statute imposed upon it. 41 In
addition, the Court found that section 706(b) gave the FCC express
authority to adopt the rules in the Open Internet Order. 42 However,
the Court deferred interpretation as to how section 706(b) gives
authority for the removal of barriers and advancement of
competition to the FCC, and it remains unclear whether the FCC
has such authority. 43
Despite finding that the FCC has statutory authority to regulate
broadband providers and to take immediate action to deploy
Internet access, remove barriers, and promote competition, the
Court found that the FCC regulations failed because they imposed
common carrier duties on broadband providers. 44 The Court
reasoned that the FCC lacked authority to impose common carrier
duties on broadband providers because the FCC itself exempted
information services like broadband providers from common carrier
duties. 45 The FCC defended the Open Internet Order on the
grounds that, unlike common carries who must provide service to all
consumers who seek it, broadband providers were still free to make
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 17944 ¶ 68.
Id. at 17945–46 ¶ 73.
Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 634 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
Id. at 637.
Id. at 638.
Id. at 641.
Id.
Id. at 655.
Id. at 650.
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individualized decisions as to end users. 46 Therefore, as long as
broadband providers were free to make individualized decisions on
whom to provide content to, any restrictions placed on whom to
accept content from did not amount to common carrier
obligations. 47 The Court refuted the FCC’s reasoning because
although end users were broadband providers’ traditional customers,
that did not mean broadband providers could not also be carriers
with respect to edge providers. 48 Because broadband providers offer
a service to edge providers in carrying edge providers’ content, the
obligations imposed by the Open Internet Order could very well
constitute common carrier duties on broadband providers, even if
edge providers are not broadband providers’ primary customers. 49
Although the Court struck down the anti-blocking and antidiscrimination requirements, its decision implied that the FCC could
regulate broadband providers in order to achieve its goals of
maintaining an open Internet and deploying Internet service to all
Americans, so long as the FCC regulates within its statutory
authority. The Court explicitly affirmed the FCC’s ability to regulate
by upholding the Commission’s interpretation of section 706 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 50 and then implied the
Commission’s regulatory power by explicitly stating that it was the
way the FCC classified broadband providers that proved problematic
in determining the common carrier question. 51 In addition, the
Court found the FCC’s prediction that the Open Internet Order will
in fact encourage Internet deployment “both rational and supported
by substantial evidence.” 52
In the months following the Verizon decision, the FCC began
reworking its Open Internet rules in order to use its statutory ability
to regulate broadband providers in a way that allows it to promote
an open Internet and deployment of advanced telecommunication
capabilities, even opening its website for public comment. The FCC
chose the best solution in February of 2015 by reclassifying
broadband providers as telecommunication services subject to
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

718

Id. at 653.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 637, 641.
Id. at 650.
Id. at 644.
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common carrier duties. 53 With this new classification, the FCC can
effectively regulate broadband providers in ways that are conducive
to the deployment of telecommunications capabilities to
all Americans.
III. THE CASE FOR COMMON CARRIER CLASSIFICATION
The fact that the D.C. Circuit court upheld the FCC’s
interpretation of its own regulatory power has important
implications for the Net Neutrality debate. The first implication is
that the Court agrees that the FCC has the power it was trying to
use to regulate broadband providers, but the agency was not
executing or exercising that power appropriately. The Court’s
recognition of the FCC’s statutory authority to regulate broadband
providers means the agency only had to find the right way to
regulate. Second, the Court stated that the Open Internet Order
regulations were problematic because the old classification of
broadband providers prevented the FCC from imposing common
carrier duties on broadband providers. 54 This suggests that if the
classification was changed to common carriers, a court would uphold
the Open Internet Order rules. The Court acknowledged the fact
that the FCC once regulated DSL providers as telecommunications
services, thus subject to common carrier duties, and then changed its
mind and reclassified DSL providers as information service providers
along with other broadband providers, thus immune to common
carrier duties, and the court upheld both of those classifications. 55
Thus, the FCC’s new classification of broadband providers is likely
to withstand judicial scrutiny as long as the FCC shows the change is
not arbitrary or capricious. 56
Furthermore, in justifying the FCC’s interpretation of Section
706, the Court explained that although the FCC’s prior
interpretation of the section had been overruled, an agency is not
bound forever by prior interpretations because “[a]n initial agency
interpretation is not instantly carved in stone.” 57 An agency need
53. Press Release, FCC, FCC Adopts Strong, Sustainable Rules to Protect the Open
Internet (Feb. 26, 2015), https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-adopts-strong-sustainablerules-protect-open-internet.
54. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 650.
55. Id. at 630–31, 650.
56. Chevron, Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
57. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 636 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863).
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only “adequately explain the reasons” for a change in policy and a
Court cannot reject a new interpretation “simply because it is
new.” 58 As a result, the FCC can now subject broadband providers
to common carrier duties as long as the Commission adequately
explains its reasons for doing so.
Unless the FCC reclassified broadband providers as common
carriers, it would be incredibly difficult, if not impossible, for it to
effectively regulate broadband providers in a way that meets the
Commission’s goals. Prior to the reclassification, broadband
providers were able, maybe even encouraged, to discriminate and
block edge provider content for no other reason than to increase
their profits. Verizon’s counsel even stated during oral arguments
that, were it not for the Open Internet Order, Verizon would be
exploring ways to charge edge providers for using Verizon’s
infrastructure to reach end users. 59 Reclassification of broadband
providers as common carriers may not seem vital to some; however,
failing to reclassify would have had adverse effects on consumers,
edge providers, and the evolution of the Internet as a whole. The
sections below explore the reasons for and benefits of imposing
common carrier duties on broadband providers.
A. Broadband Providers Are by Their Very Nature Common Carriers
Enterprises were historically classified as common carriers when
the services they provided were of a public nature. The services
offered by broadband providers are public in nature, and therefore,
broadband providers should be classified as common carriers. As a
result, this is more of making an accurate classification than a
reclassification. In Internet Interconnection, James Speta explains that
designation as a common carrier is a common law tradition. At
common law, an enterprise was classified as a common carrier when
the work or trade the enterprise carried out was considered public
for one of two reasons: (1) the activity had been historically provided
by the king or under the king’s writ; or (2) the public had assisted
the enterprise in some way. 60 Designation as a common carrier
imposed on such enterprises the duty to serve all who sought service
58. Id. at 636 (quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545
U.S. 967, 981 (2005)).
59. Id. at 646.
60. Speta, supra note 21, at 255–56.
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without discrimination and to deal on just and reasonable terms. 61
The reason for imposing common carrier duties was a fear of
monopoly, the idea that the service offered by the enterprise is
essential, or the idea that the enterprise concerns the public in
some way. 62
The reasons for imposing common carrier duties are met by the
current Net Neutrality argument. First, the threat of monopoly is
not entirely unfounded in the context of broadband providers. The
fact that broadband providers want to block competitors’
applications and content, charge edge providers for delivering their
services to end users, and establish a tiered system of services are all
relevant evidence that, unless regulated, broadband providers will use
their power and technology to block out competitors and maintain
their power and control on the market. About ninety-six percent of
Americans today only have access to, at most, two broadband
providers. 63 This suggests that there is already too little competition
in the broadband market and many of the big broadband providers
own applications that compete with smaller companies. For example,
Comcast owns Hulu, thus it would not be entirely unfounded to
think that Comcast has incentives to block other streaming video
services, like Netflix, to promote Hulu. If allowed to discriminate
content, Comcast could easily block or slow down its consumers’
connection to Netflix, but provide fast, uninterrupted access to
Hulu. Another example is AT&T’s blocking of Apple’s FaceTime
from its networks unless consumers agreed to enter into a Mobile
Share plan. 64 Fortunately, AT&T’s block on FaceTime was short
lived and ended in early 2013. 65
Further proof of a potential monopoly are the statements made
by Comcast’s CEO on national television that Comcast does not
compete with Time Warner Cable. He explicitly stated that each
broadband company focuses on different markets, saying Time
Warner is in New York and Comcast is in Philadelphia. A similar
pattern is followed in the rest of the country so the providers stay
out of each other’s way, ensuring that an end user cannot get Time
61. Id. at 251.
62. Id. at 252.
63. FCC, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN 37 (2010),
http://transition.fcc.gov/national-broadband-plan/national-broadband-plan.pdf;
Amici
Curiae, supra note 16, at 10 (arguing nineteen broadband providers control about 93% of
the market).
64. Net Neutrality Timeline, supra note 3; see infra footnote 108.
65. See infra footnote 108.
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Warner in a Comcast market. 66 In denying that broadband providers’
behavior reduces competition, the CEO of Comcast inadvertently
described a monopoly by explaining that Comcast and Time Warner,
two established and powerful broadband providers, have agreed to
not compete with each other and divided markets between each
other, driving the price of broadband service up since neither faces
real competition; the probability of a monopoly is more likely now,
along with the potential ability to also block content
and information. 67
Second, access to an open internet is essential nowadays. This is
why Congress mandated the FCC to encourage deployment of
advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans, focused
specifically on elementary and secondary schools. 68 Practically every
aspect of modern life requires access to the Internet. Elementary
schools, government agencies, small businesses, Fortune 500
companies, home security companies, restaurants, colleges, call
centers—virtually every entity, whether public or private, uses, if not
depends on, the Internet. Internet access in general is vital, but so is
access to an open Internet where individuals, business, and
governments can access the information that they want and need,
when they want and need it, without any interference from
companies who are already making millions of dollars from
customers’ dependency.
Finally, broadband providers are common carriers because the
services they willingly set out to provide are of public concern. 69 An
open Internet is a public concern because the Internet is the medium
through which our society runs. Aside from the social and
entertainment benefits that the Internet provides, there are also

66. Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Net Neutrality (HBO), (HBO Broadcast June
1, 2014), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fpbOEoRrHyU.
67. End users in the United States pay more for Internet services than end users in any
other country. However, in May 2014 the internet speed in the United States was slower than
the speed in countries like the Czech Republic, Liechtenstein, Israel, and Estonia. Id.
68. 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2012).
69. Public interest in an open Internet is demonstrated by the approximately four
million comments the FCC received in a three month period regarding Internet openness and
how to ensure net neutrality. Press Release, supra note 53; Mike Snider, Roger Yu & Emily
Brown, What is Net Neutrality and What Does It Mean for Me? (Feb. 27, 2015, 12:19 AM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2015/02/24/net-neutrality-what-is-itguide/23237737/ (arguing a majority of commenters on the Open Internet proceedings were
private individuals).
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business transactions and important private, public, and
governmental communications that happen over the Internet, as well
as important systems that stabilize our economy and safeguard our
money that would simply not work without the Internet. The
Internet is a public good. It is no longer a privilege or a luxury; it is a
public necessity and it became that way because it was not owned,
regulated, or controlled by anyone.
Attempting to impose unnatural controls and regulations, such
as discriminating or blocking content and applications based on the
source, will deteriorate the Internet ecosystem in ways that prevent
this public medium from performing the role it plays in our society.
If restricted, the Internet would become a closed-off network where
the quality and quantity of information that end users can access is
limited and where investment is likely significantly reduced, causing
the growth of the Internet to slow down. 70 To put it into
perspective, “[i]f the next Facebook has to pay for an Internet fast
lane, the next Mark Zuckerberg might go into investment banking
instead of creating the next big new thing on the Internet.” 71
Broadband providers may argue that there is nothing wrong with
asking edge providers to pay fees in order to disseminate their
content to end users; they may even claim that this model is used in
many other industries, like advertisers that must pay television and
radio stations for airtime. After all, broadband providers own the
infrastructure through which information passes from edge providers
to end users. However, there is more at stake in the Net Neutrality
controversy than what is at stake in other industries because
indiscriminate access to lawful content on the Internet is essential in
our society.
In some respects, Internet content may be available from readily
obtainable alternatives. For example, information about which stores
will have a sale on what day is accessible in other ways like watching
television, listening to the radio, or reading a newspaper. The change
in medium may present some costs, but those costs will likely not
be significant.

70. Letter from Mike Ananny et. al., Annenberg School for Communications &
Journalism, University of Southern California, to Edith Ramirez, FTC Chairwoman (Jan. 29,
2015)
[hereinafter
Professor
Letter
to
FTC],
https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/downloads/ProfessorLetterToFTC-20150129.pdf.
71. Id.
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On the other hand, many of the services and information
available through an open Internet would be incredibly costly to
obtain otherwise. Access to libraries, databases, county records,
court decisions, online classes, and bank statements could be costly
and time consuming to obtain through other mediums. In addition
to the essential uses of the Internet, leisure is also more readily
available online than through other sources. People can do almost
anything through the Internet, 72 and their ability to do so should
not be limited simply because broadband providers want more
profits either through prioritizing their own subsidiary companies or
by charging edge providers money to distribute their products
and services.
B. A Common Carrier Classification Allows the FCC to Meet Its Goals
Classifying broadband providers as common carriers allows the
FCC to reinstate the anti-discrimination and anti-blocking rules
from the Open Internet Order. It also allows the FCC to remove
barriers to infrastructure and investment by making broadband
providers transmit information indiscriminately. These policies will
help maintain an open Internet, encourage competition, and

72. Eighty-seven percent of online adults in America say the Internet and cellphones
have helped them to learn new things; over seventy percent feel they are better informed about
national and international news and pop culture; and sixty-seven percent feel better informed
about family and friends. Kristen Purcell & Lee Rainie, Americans Feel Better Informed Thanks
RES.
CTR.
(Dec.
8,
2014),
to
the
Internet,
PEW
http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/12/08/better-informed/. Twenty-eight percent of
adults read an e-book in 2013 and half own a tablet or e-reader. Kathryn Zickuhr & Lee
Rainie, E-Reading Rises and Devise Ownership Jumps, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 16, 2014),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/01/16/e-reading-rises-as-device-ownership-jumps/.
Thirty-eight percent of Americans who were single and looking for a partner said they had
used online dating sites or mobile dating apps. Aaron Smith & Maeve Duggan, Online Dating
RES.
CTR.
(Oct.
21,
2013),
&
Relationships,
PEW
http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/10/21/online-dating-relationships/. Sixty-one percent
of Internet users bank online. Susannah Fox, 51% of U.S. Adults Bank Online, PEW RES. CTR.
(Aug. 7, 2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/08/07/51-of-u-s-adults-bank-online/.
Seventy-two percent of American adults use social media. Joanna Brenner & Aaron Smith, 72%
of Online Adults are Social Networking Site Users, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 5, 2013),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/08/05/72-of-online-adults-are-social-networking-siteusers/. Of those who donated to a presidential campaign in 2012, fifty percent did so online.
Aaron Smith & Maeve Duggan, Presidential Campaign Donations in the Digital Age, PEW
RES. CTR. (Oct. 25, 2012), http://www.pewinternet.org/2012/10/25/presidentialcampaign-donations-in-the-digital-age/.
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continue the growth of the Internet, encouraging the deployment of
advanced telecommunications.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 gives the FCC the
responsibility of encouraging the reasonable and timely deployment
of advanced communications to all Americans. 73 The FCC can fulfill
this responsibility by using measures such as “price cap regulation,
regulatory forbearance, measures that promote competition in the local
telecommunications market, or other regulating methods that remove
barriers to infrastructure investment.” 74 The FCC must also make an
annual inquiry to determine the availability of advanced
telecommunications capability to all Americans. 75 If the agency
determines that advanced telecommunications are not being
deployed reasonably and timely, then it “shall take immediate action
to accelerate deployment of such capability by removing barriers to
infrastructure investment and by promoting competition in the
telecommunications market.” 76
To simplify, the goal stipulated in the Telecommunications Act of
1996 is the reasonable and timely deployment of advanced
telecommunications capability to all Americans; the FCC must not
only have this as a goal, but also must ensure that such deployment
actually happens. If Americans do not have the capability of accessing
advanced telecommunications in a reasonable and timely manner,
then the FCC must remedy this by taking immediate action to
accelerate the deployment of such capability. The FCC’s immediate
action may include removing barriers to infrastructure investment
and promoting competition.
The FCC attempted to ensure reasonable and timely deployment
through the rules imposed in the Open Internet Order. The FCC
found that deployment of advanced telecommunications capability
was neither reasonable nor timely and that broadband providers were
partly to blame for the failure in deployment. 77 As a result, the
agency used its statutory authority to remove barriers and promote
competition and adopted the transparency, anti-blocking, and antidiscrimination rules. Thus, the FCC met the necessary requirements

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

47 U.S.C. § 1302(a).
Id. (emphasis added).
47 U.S.C. § 1302(b).
Id. (emphasis added).
25 F.C.C.R. 17907 ¶ 4, 17972 ¶ 123 (Dec. 21, 2010).
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to fulfill its statutorily imposed duty by knowing its goal,
determining its goal was not being met under the then-existing
conditions, identifying the obstacles to reaching that goal, and
implementing remedial action within its authority to promote
competition and reduce barriers. The D.C. Circuit even reiterated
that the FCC had acted within its authority and duties under Section
706 of the Telecommunications Act. 78 Yet, the court chose to strike
down the anti-discrimination and the anti-blocking rules. 79 Verizon
argued, and the court agreed, that those rules imposed common
carrier duties upon broadband providers who were exempt from
those duties because they were not classified as common carriers. 80
The question that necessarily arose after Verizon was simple: if
the court held that the FCC can use measures that promote
competition and reduce barriers to ensure the reasonable and timely
deployment of advanced communications, how could the FCC
regulate the biggest obstacle to attaining this goal, namely
broadband providers, without exceeding its scope and being
overruled again? The answer was even simpler: the FCC had to
reclassify broadband providers as common carriers. 81
A reclassification of broadband providers as common carriers
allows the FCC to reinstate the anti-discrimination and anti-blocking
rules under the Open Internet Order. The D.C. Circuit already
acknowledged that the FCC has the power to regulate under Section
706 of the Telecommunications Act, so the FCC’s authority and
ability to use that authority were no longer an issue. The court also
held that Congress intended the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to
“be inserted into” the Communications Act of 1934, Title II of
which sets out regulations for common carriers. 82 So if the FCC can
promote competition and remove barriers to investment through
Section 706 and, furthermore, use that authority to regulate entities
that fall within Title II of the Communications Act, then all the FCC
had to do was impose common carrier duties on broadband
providers and then use the statutory authority granted in Section
706 of the Telecommunications Act in order to arrive at its desired

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
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Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 642 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
Id. at 655.
Id. at 655.
Id. at 655–56.
Id. at 650.
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goal of deploying advanced telecommunications capability to
all Americans.
Reclassifying broadband providers as common carriers should
not be problematic. In Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, the Supreme Court found that an agency is not bound
forever by its prior interpretations. 83 Rather, an agency may change
its mind on a prior interpretation as long as it gives an adequate
explanation for its change in policy. 84 As long as the agency’s
decision does not seem capricious and arbitrary, the Court will
uphold it, even it if is not the same outcome the Court would have
reached. 85 Therefore, the FCC just needs to provide an adequate
explanation for reclassifying broadband providers as common
carriers. One of these explanations could be that, as argued in the
previous section, broadband providers are by their very nature
common carriers, and thus should ascribe to the same rules as
enterprises classified as such.
A second explanation could be that unless the FCC reclassified
broadband providers as common carriers, the FCC would have no
power to regulate them. Leaving the FCC powerless leads to an
absurd result because the FCC would be deprived of its authority to
deploy telecommunications capabilities, increase competition, and
reduce barriers. Courts have stressed time and time again that
statutes cannot be read in such a way that leads to an absurd result. 86
Striking the new classification would result in absurdity; therefore,
not only does the new classification make sense, it is also likely to be
upheld by a court. Additionally, the FCC could argue that the public
or quasi-public nature of the service broadband providers offer
requires the imposition of common carrier duties, just like it did at
common law.
Without reclassification of broadband providers, the FCC would
be unable to ensure reasonable and timely deployment because
access to Internet content and applications will be limited, blocked,
slowed down, and interrupted by broadband providers based on
arbitrary policies such as giving preferential access to applications the

83. Chevron, Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863 (1984).
84. Verizon, 740 F.3d. at 636.
85. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866.
86. Holy Trinity Church v. U.S., 143 U.S. 457, 459–60 (1892); Green v. Bock
Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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provider owns, or limiting end-user access only to edge providers
who pay the broadband provider a fee, or offering different speeds of
Internet connection at different prices to end users.
The possibility arises that FCC regulation will impair the
development and growth of the Internet, as opposed to improving
it. Opponents of Net Neutrality argue that broadband providers are
better equipped to ensure investment and to encourage growth 87
because, after all, this is their livelihood and their area of expertise.
Therefore, broadband providers should be left alone to pursue their
business in the ways that seem most profitable, and the market will
work inconsistencies out so that deployment of advanced
telecommunications is done reasonably and timely without any
government regulation. 88 Although a scenario free from government
intervention seems ideal, it is highly unlikely. Much of the
investment in the Internet so far has come from edge providers, not
from broadband providers. Although broadband providers have
invested in improving the infrastructure, this has been largely a
reactionary effort. Edge providers have invested in new technology,
new applications, and information; end users have demanded it; and
broadband providers have responded by using bigger pipes that can
carry edge providers’ content to end users. Unless the FCC
intervenes in some way, edge provider investment will decrease once
broadband providers begin discriminating based on content because
the cost of putting content and applications on the market will
increase. 89 As a result, development will decrease, less information
will be available, and innovation will suffer.

87. Josh Steimle, Am I the Only Techie Against Net Neutrality?, FORBES (May 14,
2014, 10:09 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/joshsteimle/2014/05/14/am-i-the-onlytechie-against-net-neutrality/ (arguing that the government is too slow, and has too many
failures in the public sector to be trusted with regulating the Internet). In my opinion, the
article confuses the issues and the role the FCC seeks to play. The author accuses the FCC of
almost attempting to take over entirely; his argument is against government-owned
broadband, which is not at issue. The FCC rules seek to prohibit the creation of monopolies
and the discrimination of data that leads to restricted information by requiring disclosures so
that broadband providers do not misuse their power. See Hal Singer, How the FCC Will Wreck
the Internet, WALL STREET J. (May 28, 2015, 8:04 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/howthe-fcc-will-wreck-the-internet-1432857872 (arguing that the FCC’s Open Internet Order
will lower capital investments by broadband providers and delay innovation).
88. Steimle, supra note 87.
89. Professor Letter to FTC, supra note 69.
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C. Open Internet Will Spur Investment and Innovation
Another reason to classify broadband providers as common
carriers is to protect the “virtuous cycle/circle” of innovation.
Proponents of Net Neutrality argue that an open Internet is
necessary for two reasons. First, an open Internet will spur
innovation that will improve the Internet and the content available
on the Internet. When edge providers do not have to worry about
paying fees to have their content transmitted or have to worry about
their content being blocked from reaching end users, they are more
likely to invest resources in developing new content or spreading
new or unique information. However, if edge providers are
constantly concerned about their content being blocked, their cost
of business goes up because it takes more money to get their
information to their audience, whether that is by paying broadband
providers or by having enough funds to compete with broadband
provider’s applications.
Second, innovation will improve and benefit the economy as a
whole, creating growth, expansion, and new economic
opportunities. The Internet has led to an increase and ease in
globalization and international transactions. 90 People at any level of
entrepreneurship can participate in the market; transactions are also
facilitated between individuals wherever they may be. 91 Because
businesses can sell and transact with people all over the world, the
need for labor, manufacturing, and ideas increases to levels not
possible before.
On the other hand, without an open Internet, incentives to
invest and innovate will be reduced dramatically as the benefits of the
Internet will be internalized by broadband providers, in the form of
increased revenues and market control, and the negative effects will
be distributed amongst everyone else, through a lack of or slow

90. Just in the United States, total e-commerce sales for the first quarter of 2015 was
$80.3 billion, a 3.5 percent increase from the last quarter of 2014. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU NEWS, QUARTERLY E-COMMERCE SALES
1ST
QUARTER
2015
(May
15,
2015),
http://www2.census.gov/retail/releases/historical/ecomm/15q1.pdf.
91. For example, PayPal, which, according to its own website, has over 173 million
active customer accounts, allows payment in over 100 currencies, withdrawal of funds to bank
accounts in 57 currencies, holds balances in PayPal accounts in 26 currencies, and is available
in 203 markets. PayPal About, PAYPAL, https://www.paypal.com/us/webapps/mpp/about/
(last visited Nov. 9, 2015).
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development of new technologies and reduced quantity and quality
of content and applications.
On the first argument, Net Neutrality proponents assert that an
open Internet inspires what has come to be known as the “virtuous
circle” of innovation. 92 In the “virtuous circle,” an open Internet
motivates edge providers to invest money, time, and resources in
developing new content and applications. 93 It also motivates
investors to finance edge providers; the investors who submitted an
Amici Curiae in behalf of the FCC, claim that such investment spurs
better and faster development than would occur otherwise. 94 The
rapid Internet development results in increased demand from end
users for faster Internet and access to more content and
applications. 95 The increase in demand encourages broadband
providers to invest in bigger and better transmission technology. 96
The improved technology fosters new investment in development of
content and applications, which restarts the cycle all over again. 97
While it is true that providing bigger pipes is a significant investment
paid for mostly by broadband providers, these broadband providers
benefit by the increased end-user demand, which leads to increased
profits. In 2013, Comcast saw an eight percent revenue gain in its
broadband division alone. 98
Net Neutrality is a requisite in order for innovation and
investment to continue. The Internet has been successful because of
its open nature; had the Internet been a closed system from the
beginning, it would not have seen the growth and success that
characterize it. The Internet grew and prospered because of three
open-Internet characteristics. First, there were no gatekeepers when

92. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
93. Amici Curiae, supra note 16, at 2.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2–3.
96. Id. at 3.
97. Id.
98. Brian Stelter, Comcast Profit Jumps 28.6% on Growth of Broadband, N.Y. TIMES,
(July 31, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/01/business/media/comcast-profitjumps-26-on-growth-of-broadband.html?_r=0; see also AT&T to Invest $14 Billion to
Significantly Expand Wireless and Wireline Broadband Networks, Support Future IP Data
Growth and New Services, AT&T (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.att.com/gen/pressroom?pid=23506&cdvn=news&newsarticleid=35661 (stating that AT&T expects its growth
drivers, wireless, wireline, and managed IT services to make up ninety percent of total revenues
by 2016).
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the Internet started. 99 The Internet was completely open to anyone
with an idea; as the Wireless Founders Coalition for Innovation
stated, “[w]hat makes the wireline Internet so friendly from an
entrepreneur’s perspective is its Openness. One does not have to ask
Comcast or Time Warner Cable or even Verizon’s DSL division for
permission to launch a new product, service, or device.” 100 Indeed,
the open Internet provides a forum for all kinds of content and
Internet applications and provides individuals and corporations alike
the ability to disseminate information and reach people across the
globe without first having to ask anyone for permission.
Second, the Internet was initially created to be “applicationblind.” 101 From the beginning, the idea was that the technology
supporting the flow of traffic would be indifferent to the “substance,
functionality, and content of that traffic.” 102 This structure allowed
the Internet to be accessible to any new application in the future,
thus avoiding application-specific functionality. 103 Because
indiscriminate access was the purpose of the Internet, transmission
devices only looked at information’s forwarding address, not the
substance of the information; 104 in fact, transmission devices were
unable to look at the information’s content at all, thus broadband
providers were unable to distinguish between types of applications. 105
However, new technological development, brought in large part
from openness that spurred investment, has resulted in specialized
tools that have the capacity of identifying between packets of
information. 106 This technology not only allows broadband providers
to identify the substance of the information going through their
transmission lines, but also allows them to “block, shape, monitor,
and prioritize that traffic.” 107
99. Amici Curiae, supra note 16, at 4.
100. Id. at 4–5 (quoting Letter from Wireless Founders Coalition for Innovation to
Chairman Kevin Martin, WT Docket Nos. 06-150, 96-86, PS Docket No. 06-229, at 3 (June
7, 2007)).
101. Id. at 5.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 5–6.
105. Id. at 6.
106. Id. at 16.
107. Id. at 2, 16–17 (quoting Nate Anderson, Deep Packet Inspection Meets Net
Neutrality,
ARS
TECHNICA
(July
26,
2007),
http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2007/07/deep-packet-inspection-meets-net-neutrality/).
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Broadband providers with access to these tools now can act on
their incentives to discriminate between content and have actually
used that technology to discriminate, such as AT&T blocking
Apple’s FaceTime from its networks unless consumers entered into a
Mobile Share Plan. 108 Such technological breakthroughs call for
different approaches to maintaining an open Internet. Gone are the
days when the market would regulate itself; instead, the advances
and development that came as a result of an open Internet now
provide the means for gatekeepers to block content and for the
potential monopolization of the market to the detriment of all
involved, except for broadband providers.
Third, the Internet was intended to be a general-purpose
resource. 109 The availability of the network to everyone fostered an
environment in which anyone could add to the already existing
infrastructure. 110 The accessibility that characterizes the Internet has
allowed robust competition between edge providers, thus improving
the speed, infrastructure, content, and availability of information on
the Internet. Thus the “virtuous circle” of innovation caused the
Internet to explode and become the ever-changing and evolving tool
we depend so much on. Curtailing edge provider development and
innovation by allowing broadband providers to discriminate, slow
down, and block content would damage the competitive nature of
the Internet and reduce its efficiency and development in
unimaginable ways. The drafters of the Amici Brief in support of the
FCC have explicitly expressed their reluctance to invest in Internet
development if broadband providers are not regulated and are

108. David Sohn, Assessing AT&T Limits on FaceTime, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY AND
TECH. (Nov. 12, 2012), https://cdt.org/blog/assessing-att’s-limits-on-facetime/; see also Net
Neutrality Timeline, supra note 3; AT&T Blocking FaceTime, SAVE THE INTERNET,
http://www.savetheinternet.com/att-facetime (last visited Nov. 30, 2015). Thankfully,
AT&T’s block of FaceTime was short lived and ended in early 2013. Cecilia Kang, AT&T lifts
FaceTime restrictions on Apple iPhones, WASH. POST BLOG (Nov. 8, 2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-tech/post/atandt-lifts-facetime-restrictionson-apple-iphones/2012/11/08/cbec36de-29de-11e2-b4e0-346287b7e56c_blog.html; Brian
X. Chen, AT&T Backpedals on FaceTime Restrictions, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Nov. 8, 2012),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/att-backpedals-on-facetime-restrictions/?_r=1;
Kevin Bostic, AT&T to Bring FaceTime Over Cellular to All Customers by End of Year,
APPLEINSIDER (May 20, 2013), http://appleinsider.com/articles/13/05/20/att-to-bringfacetime-over-cellular-to-all-customers-by-end-of-year.
109. Amici Curiae, supra note 16, at 6.
110. Id.
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allowed to interfere with the dissemination of information through
the Internet. 111
Aside from the benefits and increased development that openness
has brought for the Internet itself, there are economic benefits that
also come from Internet openness that benefit society as a whole and
which should be a motivating factor for regulation of broadband
providers as common carriers. An open Internet encourages
entrepreneurship by edge providers, 112 which turns into increases in
the number of business and transactions. Take the World Wide Web
for example: open access to this application allows the existence of
websites, like Etsy, that encourage start-up entrepreneurship. Thus, a
homemaker in Salt Lake City, Utah can sell homemade metal
necklaces and bracelets not just to her neighbors, friends, and family,
but also to people in her entire city, state, country, and even
internationally. Though the impact of such an enterprise may seem
small and inconsequential, consider a simplified version of the effects
at each step of the transaction. The homemaker posts her product on
Etsy; a consumer freely accesses it and decides to purchase a
necklace. The consumer pays for the product online, probably
through some third-party that will retain a small percentage of the
payment for facilitating the transaction; the payment also involves
the consumer’s bank, which becomes a player in the small $50
transaction. Upon receiving the order, the homemaker goes to her
local hardware store to purchase supplies to make the consumer’s
necklace. Purchasing the materials then involves the hardware store
owner, be it a regional store or local business; regardless of its
identity, said business likely purchased the materials from, at the very
least, one other distributor, who likely procured the raw materials
from some other business. After acquiring the necessary supplies, the
homemaker goes home and makes the necklace, which she later
sends through the mail—involving yet another player in the
transaction. The cycle continues with not just this homemaker, but
with thousands of people like her who offer a variety of goods and
services, from banking to online payments, shopping to blogs, and
newspapers to hair salons. All of these enterprises can participate in
the national and global economy because the Internet is an
open forum.
111.
112.

Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 4.
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The ability to share, create, sell, trade, and disseminate through
the Internet has had a significant impact on the worldwide economy.
A research study carried out by the global management-consulting
firm McKinsey & Company shows that, as of October 2011, the
Internet accounted for twenty-one percent of “GDP growth in
mature economies.” 113 The same report showed that the Internet
accounted for 3.4 percent of GDP in developed economies “that
make up 70 percent of global GDP.” 114 The total contribution to the
global GDP was larger than the GDP of Canada or Spain and the
Internet’s contribution was growing faster than Brazil’s GDP. 115 In
fact, the Internet’s contribution to GDP in 2009 was larger than that
of the Education, Communication, Agriculture, Utilities, and
Mining sectors. 116 In the five years prior to the McKinsey study, the
Internet made up twenty-one percent of GDP growth in advanced
economies. 117 If the Internet were a country, it would be one of
“the world’s top five economies.” 118
The development of the Internet is also responsible for job
creation; in France, the Internet destroyed about 500,000 jobs in
fifteen years, but created 1.2 million new jobs—which translates into
2.4 new jobs for every job destroyed. 119 Small businesses have also
grown immensely because of the Internet. 120 In a survey of more
than 4,800 small and medium enterprises, those businesses that
made substantial use of the Internet for their business grew twice as
much over a three-year period as those that did not use the Internet
as much. 121 Those same businesses also made twice as much revenue
from exports as businesses that did not use the Internet with the
same intensity. 122 The Internet has also improved the standard of

113. James Manyika & Charles Roxburgh, The Great Transformer: The Impact of the
Internet on Economic Growth and Prosperity, MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST. (Oct. 2011),
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/high_tech_telecoms_internet/the_great_transformer.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. Ex. 2.
117. Id.
118. DALBERG, OPEN FOR BUSINESS?: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF INTERNET
OPENNESS
27
(Mar.
2014),
http://www.dalberg.com/documents/Open_for_Business_Dalberg.pdf.
119. Manyika & Roxburgh, supra note 113.
120. Id.
121. Id. Ex. 3.
122. Id.
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living. 123 As the Internet environment matures and evolves, the
standard of living in advanced economies has increased by an average
of $500 in real per capita GDP; that improvement over fifteen years
is the same as the improvement that resulted from the Industrial
Revolution over a fifty-year period. 124 In addition, ease of
transactions, lowering of transaction costs, and the ability to compare
prices and find and purchase from competing businesses have
empowered consumers who are a click away from getting whatever
they want. 125 McKinsey also found that online prices are ten percent
lower on average than the cost of “offline counterparts.” 126 This
leads to price transparency and increases savings for consumers
anywhere from $18 to $28 per month 127—who then put those
savings back into the economy through spending or investing. To
ensure that consumers and countries continue to reap the benefits
that have thus far come from the Internet, the Internet must remain
open. The open nature of the Internet is what has led to such
unprecedented growth and other economic benefits. Once barriers
to content and accessibility are adopted, not only may investment
incentives disappear, but also consumers’ ability to use the Internet
in the same way will be impaired. A study by Dalberg Global
Development Advisors found a strong correlation between Internet
openness in a given country and the degree to which that country’s
economy has benefited from the Internet. 128 There are exceptions
where a country still sees comparable benefits despite the lack of
Internet openness because of the country’s large population. 129

123. Id.
124. Id.
125. A 2008 Pew Research Center study on online shopping reports that 66% of online
Americans have purchased something online, 78% agree that online shopping is convenient,
and 68% agree “that online shopping saves them time.” In 2007, 60% of Americans used the
Internet for “product-related research,” and 93% of Internet users in 2007 had “done
something related to e-commerce.” John B. Horrigan, Online Shopping, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb.
13, 2008), http://www.pewinternet.org/2008/02/13/online-shopping/.
126. Manyika & Roxburgh, supra note 113.
127. Id.
128. The more open the Internet in a given country, the higher the economic impact of
the Internet. DALBERG, supra note 118, at 28 fig. 4. The more restrictions a country has, the
less the Internet contributes “to the overall economy.” Id. at 29 fig. 5.
129. Id. (arguing that economic benefits are visible regardless of a country’s economic
development); id. at 31 fig. 6 (showing that countries classified as “partly free”/”not free” by
Freedom of the Net have underperforming Internet economies); id. at 30 (explaining that
China’s Internet economy has grown and managed to have a higher than expected economic
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Internet restrictions, on the other hand, “increase . . . the cost of
doing business,” consequently reducing investment and use of the
Internet because the burdens of those restrictions outweigh the
benefits. 130 As a result, the countries with fewer restrictions on the
Internet see the most benefit, in terms of Internet usage’s
contribution to their GDP, 131 though there is still not enough data
to confirm this through a “statistically significant causal
relationship.” 132 Placing restrictions on the Internet reduces
investors’ confidence in the market, consequently reducing
investment; entrepreneurs and edge providers also have to use
money that would otherwise go to innovation and business growth
on compliance and paying broadband providers for access instead. 133
There is also a decrease in the quality and availability of information
that could spur economic growth. 134
D. Long History of Applying Common Carrier Duties
Common carrier duties would apply even if broadband providers
were still classified as information-service providers, rather than
telecommunication service providers because of a long tradition of
imposing common carrier duties on information-service providers. If
the FCC initially classified information-service providers as common
carriers, there must have been a good reason for doing so that is
likely applicable now. While the technology used now is very
different from that used when the FCC adopted its first set of
regulations on broadband providers back in the 1970s, some of the
policy reasons may still be applicable. Additionally, the change in
policy excepting information-service providers from common carrier
duties seems to have been solely based on the uncertainty of the
market and future technology 135 and not necessarily on a concrete
factor that required such a change. In fact, there are several pieces of
historical evidence that show not only the old practice of regulating
impact despite the many restrictions on Internet use, possibly as a result of China’s huge
Internet user base of nearly 600 million).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. In re Second Computer Inquiry (Second Computer Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384,
473 (1980).
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information-services providers as common carriers, but also
Congress’ legislative intent and the Court’s interpretation of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.
First, in 1980, the FCC abandoned its tradition of imposing
common carrier duties on entities in control of the last-mile. 136
Before this change, the FCC required that information-service
providers offer their enhanced services through a completely
independent corporate entity and, furthermore, imposed common
carrier duties on information-service providers when offering their
transmission facilities to other enhanced service providers. 137 When
the FCC amended its practice, it imposed the restrictions only on
certain entities like AT&T and GTE. 138 The FCC justified its change
in policy by stating that applying its maximum separation policy to
all carriers was inappropriate in the context of the present and
anticipated applications of computer processing. 139 Thus, the FCC’s
new approach changed a decade-old tradition.
Second, during a brief period of time, the FCC classified DSL
providers as telecommunication services. 140 The FCC concluded that
some packet-switched services like DSL were simply transmission
technologies because all they did was transport information between
points without changing the information’s form or content. 141
However, the FCC did differentiate between transmission through
DSL as a telecommunications service and Internet access itself as an
information service. 142 As a result, DSL providers could exempt their
Internet access service from common carrier regulation, but not
their transmission services. 143
The FCC later changed its mind and reclassified DSL providers
as information services exempt from common carrier regulations. 144
The FCC concluded “that wireline broadband Internet access service

136. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 638 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Second Computer Inquiry,
77 F.C.C.2d at 473.
137. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 629–30.
138. Second Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d at 472–73.
139. Id.
140. 13 FCC Rcd. 24012, 24029–30 ¶ 35 (1998).
141. Id. at 24030 ¶ 35.
142. Id. at 24030 ¶ 36.
143. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 631 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
144. Id.
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provided over a provider’s own facilities is an information service.” 145
In choosing to reclassify DSL providers in both 20 F.C.C.R. 14862
and 17 F.C.C.R. 3033, the FCC reached a “tentative conclusion.” 146
This suggests a reluctance to definitely and conclusively classify DSL
and other broadband services as information services. If classification
as information services was obvious or required, the FCC’s
conclusion should be nothing but conclusive.
Third, the legislative history of the Telecommunications Act of
1996 suggests that common carrier regulation of broadband
providers is a way in which the FCC can achieve its statutorily
imposed goals. The Senate Report before the Act was passed explains
that Section 304 of the Act, requiring the FCC to initiate and
complete
regular
inquiries
to
ensure
deployment
of
telecommunications capabilities in a “reasonable and timely” fashion,
was a “necessary fail-safe” to make sure the bill met its objective. 147
The legislative history further states that if the FCC finds that
telecommunications capabilities are not being deployed promptly,
the FCC is required to take immediate action, which may include
“methods that remove barriers and provide the proper incentives for
infrastructure investment.” 148 The Report also states that the
purpose of the Act is to enable subscribers throughout the United
States to “send and receive information in all its forms—voice, data,
graphics, and video—over a high-speed switched, interactive,
broadband, transmission capability.” 149 If the FCC can use any
method to ensure deployment for the purpose of giving end users
access to a broad array of services through broadband, then
reclassification of broadband providers in order to reach that goal
would be allowable. As long as the FCC does not overstep its
statutory authority and it gives adequate explanation for the
reclassification, the FCC should have no problems implementing its
new rules, even if its new policy were challenged.
Finally, the Supreme Court was not entirely on board with the
FCC’s last classification of broadband providers. In Nat’l Cable &
145. 20 FCC Rcd. 14853, 14862 ¶ 12 (2014) (quoting In re Appropriate Framework
for Broadband Access to Internet over Wireline Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 3019, 3033 ¶
24 (2002)).
146. Id.; 17 FCC Rcd. 3019, 3033 ¶ 16 (2002).
147. S. REP. NO. 104-23, at 50–51 (1995).
148. Id. at 50.
149. Id. at 51.
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Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., Justice Breyer,
though concurring with the majority’s opinion, concluded that the
FCC’s classification of broadband providers “just barely” fell within
the agency’s statutory authority. 150 Justice Scalia, on the other hand,
dissented from the majority’s opinion, concluding that the FCC
effectively set up a “regime of non-regulation.” 151 In addition,
Justice Scalia concluded that the FCC had exceeded its statutory
authority by giving the statute an “implausible reading.” 152
IV. CONCLUSION
The D.C. Circuit Court’s decision in Verizon certainly limited the
FCC’s ability to regulate broadband providers in a way that allows the
FCC to continue to meet its statutory obligations and its goals under
the Internet Order. However, with its latest decision, the FCC can still
regulate broadband providers in a way that complies with the
language of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the
Communications Act of 1934. The first step in regulating within these
two statutes was imposing common carrier duties on broadband
providers because of the nature of the services these enterprises
provide. Now that broadband providers have been reclassified as
common carriers, they must provide service indiscriminately, justly,
reasonably, and to all customers and edge providers who seek it.
Although some argue that markets work better when they are free
from government regulation and interference, in this case all the FCC
is doing is ensuring that the Internet is left open and that broadband
providers cannot use technology to deprive customers and edge
providers from the benefits of an open Internet.
There are strong reasons for allowing the FCC to regulate in an
effort to ensure an open Internet. The first of these is the nature of
the enterprise broadband providers are involved in. Internet service
has become a necessity, and as such, it must remain open for
individuals and entities to access it in the way they are used to
accessing it; in addition, the Internet is a public good that is vital in
everyday modern life. Second, imposing common carrier duties on
broadband providers ensures the FCC can meet its statutorily imposed
150. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1003
(2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
151. Id. at 1005 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
152. Id.
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goals of encouraging the reasonable and timely deployment of
advanced communications to all Americans. Third, an open Internet
will spur innovation and investment both within the
telecommunications market and in the economy as a whole. An open
Internet will continue to benefit the economy as a whole and to
connect people, businesses, and consumers across the globe. It will
result in improved quantity and quality of information available to all.
Finally, there is a long history of imposing common carrier duties on
enterprises like broadband providers. Members of the Supreme Court
have suggested that the FCC is within its power to regulate
broadband providers like it regulates common carriers, and there is at
least some evidence that Congress intended the FCC to regulate
broadband providers as common carriers.
How broadband providers will be regulated depends mostly on
the FCC. The agency can decide to impose common carrier duties on
broadband providers. Because neither the Telecommunications Act
nor the Communications Act states what duties information services
are subject to, 153 the FCC should be able to change its policy as long
as it has a legitimate purpose, including maintaining an open Internet.
Such a change is within the agency’s authority and a court should
defer to the agency. This is just one way for the FCC to regulate
broadband providers in a way that maintains an open Internet.
Thankfully the agency has demonstrated a commitment to the open
Internet. Exactly how this decision will be challenged remains to be
seen, 154 and one can only hope that the courts will uphold the FCC
and allow the Internet to remain the open, unrestricted forum it
has become.
Emma N. Cano*

153. Supra note 23 and accompanying text.
154. AT&T has already joined other trade groups in filing suits claiming the FCC acted
capriciously, arbitrarily, and in violation of federal law. Ryan Knutson, AT&T Sues to Overturn
FCC’s Net Neutrality Rules, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 14, 2015, 6:56 PM),
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